Course Review as of 4 December 2002
- Constitutional Powers of Congress (Ch. 2 Stewart)
Table 2.2 p. 69 of Stewart.
Summary of Concepts, p. 82-83.
- 1879 - 2002 Democrat - Republican Party system in Congress (Ch. 3 Stewart;
Chs. 1, 2 and 3, D&O; Chs. 3 and 4 P&R)
A Competitive system until Great Depression. After 1930 Democratic Party was dominate until
1994 (Republicans won 1946 and 1952 elections, won Senate in 1980 elections).
Congress: 1879 - 2002 Percent Democrat
1960s - 1990s -- Republicans become dominate political party in the South (11 States of the Confederacy + KY + OK)
House: 1879 - 2002 Percent Southern Seats
Held by Republicans
Senate: 1879 - 2002 Percent Southern Seats
Held by Republicans
House: 1879 - 2002 Percent Northern and Southern Seats
Held by Republicans
Senate: 1879 - 2002 Percent Northern and Southern Seats
Held by Republicans
- Changes in the Economy Since the Late 19th Century
Real GDP increases from 1.5 Trillion in 1947 to 9.5 Trillion in 2002
U.S. Real GDP 1947 - 2002
Real per capita GDP (the correct measure of economic improvement) increased from about $10,000 per capita in 1947 to about $34,000 in 2001.
U.S. Real Per Capita GDP 1929 - 2001
The business cycle has moderated substantially after WWII - recessions are not as sharp as they were before WWII. The Reagan and Clinton Booms were separated by only one year of slight (about -1%) negative growth.
Percent Change in Real Per Capita GDP From Previous Year 1929 - 2001
Unemployment rose from 3% in 1929 to a peak of 24.9% in 1933 - the Great Depression. It fell to about 14% in 1937 before President Roosevelt tried to balance the budget sending the economy back into recession.
The economy recovered sharply between 1933 and 1937 - it is unclear how much of this was due to President Roosevelt's New Deal economic policies. Unemployment was clearly reduced by the works projects of the New Deal.
The build-up to WWII produced strong economic growth 1938-1941 and by 1941 unemployment was down to 9% (still a very high level compared to the 1920s).
Since the end of WWII overall unemployment has never gone above 10%.
Non-White Unemployment has been consistently higher than White unemployment - a difference of around 5%.
During the Clinton economic boom non-White unemployment dropped faster than White unemployment.
Unemployment: 1929 - 2002
Unemployment: 1948 - 2002
Since the 1950s there has been a tremendous increase in the labor force participation of women.
Labor Force Participation: 1955 - 2001
Big spikes during both World Wars. Deflation during the Great Depression.
Slow increase in inflation from 1964 to its peak in 1979 - inflation and high rate of unemployment - stagflation - made President Carter a one term President.
Sharp decline under Reagan and continuing slow decline under Clinton.
Inflation Rate: 1914 - 2002
Big increase in Unionization during the 1930s after the Wagner Act of 1935 (NLRA - National Labor Relations Act). NLRA guaranteed the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively. Set up the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to hold supervised elections among employees when there was a dispute over which union should represent them.
Slow decline since 1960.
Union Membership: 1930 - 2000
Income Inequality - Series mirrors labor union series.
1913 Income Tax Amendment passed.
1916 Estate Tax Passed.
High rates during WWI.
Tax cuts under Harding & Coolidge.
During the early period before the Great Depression, income was mostly from wealth holdings - income from dividends.
High taxes during Great Depression and WWII - 1944 91% top marginal rate.
Reagan Tax cuts.
Increased under President Clinton.
Currently, 80% is Wage and Entrepreneurial Income, only 20% Capital Income (many stocks do not pay dividends!).
Top 1% Income Share: 1913 - 1998
The Lorenz Curve and the Gini Index are Measures of Income Inequality across a
defined population.
Lorenz Curve: U.S. 1994
The Gini Index For families by Race - Inequality Has Been Increasing Since the Middle 1960s.
The rates are higher for Blacks and Hispanics - that is, inequality within each group is higher than for Whites.
Trends began before Reagan, accelerated in the 1980s with some leveling off in the 1990s.
Note that during the Clinton boom the gini indexes for all three groups have gotten closer together!
Gini Index: 1947 - 2000
If income inequality is increasing, how could it be that home ownership is increasing?
Note the drop during the Great Depression then the Huge Jump from 1940 to 1950 (Housing Tracts, etc.).
Another big jump from 1950 to 1960, then a leveling off.
Flat during the 1970s with a slight decline during the early 1980s.
Takes off during the Clinton boom.
Home Ownership: 1900 - 2001
Possible Explanation - Increasing Inequality occurring during huge increase in
wealth (real per capita GDP has doubled from 1960s to late 1990s). Could it
be the case that the real prices of goods have fallen faster than we realize
and real wages have risen faster than we realize. A good example of this is
the price of light!
Price of Light: 1800 - 1992
- Morris Fiorina, The Mystery of the Vanishing Marginals, and the (Un)Vanishing Marginals (ch. 7 D&O)
Note that Total Vote Percentages does not translate linearly into House Seats.
Democrats: 1946 - 2000 Seats vs. Votes
Republicans: 1946 - 2000 Seats vs. Votes
Bimodal Distribution in 1972
1972 Mayhew Graph
Unimodal Distribution before the 1960s
1948 Mayhew Graph
1960 Mayhew Graph
The importance of marginal districts -- Presidential Coattails!
Presidential Coattails -- Unimodal Distribution
Presidential Coattails -- Bimodal Distribution
More Recent Graphs -- Some bimodality in 1988, very little in 1992
1988 Mayhew Graph
1992 Mayhew Graph
2000 Gore Vote
The fraction of Marginal Districts declined 1960 - 1984 - during period that
Fiorina wrote about. The fraction then turned up after 1984 but BIG VARIANCE!
Percent Marginal Districts: 1946 - 1998
Incumbency Advantage clearly increased after 1960 - the culprit that Fiorina fingered for the cause of the "Vanishing Marginals"
Sophomore Surge - Increase in vote percentage from first election to second election (technically, the average).
Retirement Slump - Average change of party's percentage in the district from last election of retiring incumbent to percentage garnered by retiring incumbent's party's candidate.
The two measures both change sharply after 1960 (graphs end in 1990!). The Senate
effects are not as dramatic.
House Incumbency Advantage
Senate Incumbency Advantage
The Evidence: Increases in Congressional Staff. Note huge jump after WWII then
leveling off. The big rise was just before Keystone came out in 1977. This can
be Hill staff + District Office Staff. Committee Staff
a. Committee staff story the same as overall staff.
Congressional Staff
Committee Staff
The Evidence: Pages in the Federal Register.
Pages in the Federal Register: 1936-2001
The Change After the 1980s -- Everyone Uses the "Casework Style". National Forces Reassert Themselves.
Local-National Effects Midterm House Elections
Local-National Effects Presidential Year House Elections
Fiorina: The Money Did it!
Campaign Expenditures Congressional Elections
Soft Money Congressional Elections
Summary
Summary of the Keystone Argument
- The Importance of Redistricting
Fiorina rejected redistricting as an explanation of the "Vanishing Marginals"
in his 1977 book but Cox and Katz in Elbridge Gerry's Salamander argue
that redistricting was an important factor. Below is an example of why
redistricting is important.
Hypothetical State to be Redistricted
First Republican Plan
Second Republican Plan
Democratic Plan
- The Spatial Model of Voting and Party Competition (Ch. 1 Stewart; Chs. 1, 2, 3, 4 P&R)
Hotelling's store location problem - assume houses strung out along the street.
Assume the two stores offer identical service, etc.
Assume the people always shop at the closest store (what does "closest" mean here??? A: DISTANCE - i.e., walking distance).
Solution - The point that minimizes the sum of the walking distances of the n residents is the solution -- The Median.
Figure 1.1 (Stewart): Competition for Customers Between Two Shop Owners
Assume the citizens vote for the candidate closest to them.
Assume the candidates can take any policy position (ignore "crossing-over" problem).
Solution - the median voter.
Figure 1.2 (Stewart): Competition for Two Candidates for Votes
Assume the legislators vote for the policy closest to them.
Assume that legislator ideal points are fixed.
Note that if you allow the legislators to offer amendments a policy located at the median committee member's ideal point always wins.
Figure 1.3 (Stewart): Voting in a Committee over Two Minimum Wage Proposals, X and Y
What does "closest" mean? Utility - how much pleasure/satisfaction a voter/legislator gets from a particular policy (concept from Economics).
Utility is a maximum at the voter/legislator's ideal point and then declines as you move away from the ideal point in any direction - This is known as SINGLE-PEAKED utility/preferences.
Quadratic Utility function - Utility = a - b(distance between ideal point and policy)**2.
Figure 1.4 (Stewart): Quadratic Utility Function
Utility and Preferences are interchangeable concepts in most of what we do because we assume that people prefer more utility (closer outcome) to less utility (outcome further away).
Normal Distribution Utility Function - Not much in tails.
Helps explain behavior of extremists.
Figure 2.2 (Poole and Rosenthal) Normal Distribution Utility Function
Examples of Two Dimensional Quadratic Utility Functions.
Figure 1.10 (Stewart): Two Dimensional Quadratic Utility Function
Two Dimensional Quadratic Utility Function (Ordeshook)
A "Contour Map" of a Two Dimensional Utility Function. Looking down on it
like a contour map of a mountain - the curves trace out the same height -
these are known as indifference curves.
Indifference Curves Over Two Issue Dimensions
Figure 1.11 (Stewart): Examples of Indifference Curves
The Two Dimensional Normal Distribution Utility Function.
Bivariate Normal Utility Function
Indifference Curves Over Two Issue Dimensions (Correlated Dimensions)
Bivariate Normal Utility Function (Correlated Dimensions)
Roll Call Voting on One Basic Dimension -- How issue mappings occur.
Figure 2.3 (Poole and Rosenthal) Voting in One Dimension
Roll Call Voting on Two Basic Dimensions -- How issue mappings occur.
Figure 2.4 (Poole and Rosenthal) Constraint Example in Two Dimensional Space
- The Ideological Structure of Congressional Voting (Ch. 1 Stewart; Chs. 1, 2, 3, 4, P&R)
The Basic Space is Two Dimensional - Economic Issues, "Social" Issues.
No coherent underlying philosophy - Democrats less regulation on social issues more regulation on economic issues - Republicans just the opposite.
GUN CONTROL! Pushed by Democrats - it does not "fit" with the usual social issues like Abortion, Gay Rights, etc.
The Basic Space of American Politics
From the end of
Reconstruction until the late 1930s congressional voting was essentially one
dimensional. Beginning in the 1930s an important 2nd dimension
appeared that picked up the division within the Democratic party over Civil
Rights for Blacks. The clear division of the Democrats into Northern and
Southern parties can be seen in the spatial separation of the "S" and "D"
tokens. After the mid-1970s this division gradually disappears and voting is
once again largely one dimensional. A very important feature that the animated gifs
show is that the same forces are at work on both
chambers. The two scalings are completely separate but the voting structures
in the two chambers are exactly the same. The Big Story of the past 40 years -
The realignment of the South into the Republican
Party - it now has peaked.
Animated Gif for the 46th to the
105th Congresses
The 80th (1947-48) Congress US Map
The 100th (1987-88) Congress US Map
The 2000 Presidential Election
The Histograms of the 107th House and Senate over the Liberal-Conservative
Dimension are BIMODAL.
The 107th House DW-NOMINATE Histogram
The 107th Senate DW-NOMINATE Histogram
- The Polarization of the Congressional Parties (Chs. 1, 2, 3, D&O; Ch. 4, P&R)
House Polarization Over History. The graph shows average between and within Party
distances for the Democrats and the Republicans.
Within party measure: compute the distance
between every possible pair of D's/R's and divide by the number of
pairs.
Between party measure: compute the distance between every possible D-R
pair and divide by the number of pairs.
The House: 1789 - 2002
Senate -- Basically the same pattern as the House. The larger
within party distances for the Senate in the early 20th Century
are due to the Progressive bloc of Republican Senators.
The Senate: 1789 - 2002
The Figure below shows the party distances
for all Representatives for the 46th to the 105th Houses
(note that this is the same figure shown above)
along with the same measures without the Southern States. The Pearson
correlations between the measures are shown in the upper figure. The realignment
of the South in the modern period cannot by itself account
the recent trend to polarization.
Is it the South?
The basic difference between the
two political parties is their differing views on the role of government
in the economy. We do not have a well articulated theory but it
fundamentally makes sense that as the income/wealth distribution in
society begins to skew that this would show itself eventually in
the political system in that it would draw more people into the
political arena that on the one hand would want to defend the
status quo and on the other hand would want to reform the system.
Top 1% Income Share: 1913 - 1998
The percent
foreign born are from the U.S. Census. The basic idea is that
immigrants tend to come in at the lower end of the income/wealth
distribution. Hence, the more foreign born there are, the more
inequality of income/wealth.
Foreign Born: 1880 - 1997
"Move the Previous Motion" rule allows a vote to end debate - accidentally left out of Senate Rules in 1806 - Hence Debate could be unlimited!!!! FILIBUSTER.
Only after a "small group of willful men" (Woodrow Wilson's term) filibustered the League of Nations Treaty in 1919 did the Senate adopt the first version of Rule 22.
Rule 22 - 2/3 Present and Voting can end debate - CLOTURE MOTION.
7 March 1975 changed to 3/5 total Senate (60 Votes).
Effects - (Sinclair essay in Congress Reconsidered) - More Unanimous Consent Agreements.
HOLDS - Threats to object to a Unanimous Consent Agreement - Results in much behind-the-scenes negotiation between Senators favoring a particular bill and those Senators who have filed "Holds" on the bill.
NON-GERMANE Amendments - Can offer other pieces of legislation as amendments to a bill on the floor - Majority Leader can make a Motion to Table - Nondebatable - But Majority Leader's party members then HAVE TO VOTE!
Cloture Votes in the Senate: 1919 - 2001
The Judiciary Committee and Court Appointments. Note that the DW-NOMINATE
coordinate lines up for the most part with rank ordering.
Note the BIG GAP between Dianne Feinstein and Arlen Specter - Specter the only
true Moderate on the committee.
The 107th Senate Judiciary Committee
9 October 2002: Leahy Reneges on Promise to Thurmond
- The Importance of Voting Rules (Ch. 1, Stewart)
The Roman Senate Example
The Paradox of Voting (Condorcet Paradox)
Lessons From the Roman Senate and Paradox of Voting Examples
Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (D-NY) offered an amendment that
barred federal funds from going to states that failed to comply with the
decisions of the Supreme Court (1954 Brown vs. Board of Education).
This would have denied aid to segregated schools (the South). This
transformed the debate over the bill from a one-dimensional economic
issue to a two-dimensional economic and school desegregation issue.
Sophisticated Voting by the Conservative Republicans almost certainly
killed the bill which would have otherwise passed.
The Powell Amendment
Agenda control -- McKelvey's Theorem makes it crystal clear that we must
consider agenda control as part of any voting institution. McKelvey's
Theorem shows that single-peaked preferences are not enough to
guarantee a majority outcome when there is more than one dimension!
We need more structure than just single-peaked preferences to get
equilibrium in more than one dimension!
McKelvey's "Chaos" Theorem
- Congressional Elections -- Turnout and Trust
Note that Total Vote Percentages does not translate linearly into House Seats.
Democrats: 1946 - 2000 Seats vs. Votes
Republicans: 1946 - 2000 Seats vs. Votes
Midterm Loss of Seats (Stewart Table 4.3) - Percent of 2-party vote that the
President's party got in the Presidential election year and the next
off-year election - note that it is always positive. Democrats
gained seats in 1998 for the first time since 1934.
Midterm Loss of Seats by the President's Party
Turnout 1930 - 2000 - Always lower in "off-year" elections.
Even during Presidential years, several
percent of the public vote for President but not for the House!! Also
note that turnout peaked 40 years ago! Slight upticks in 1984, 1992,
2000, but the general trend is downward!
Turnout 1930 - 2000
Turnout 1788 - 1992 - Peaked period through the Civil War - declined
from the 1890s until the 1920s - bumped up briefly after women were
added to the electorate - bumped up again after WWII and peaked in 1960,
and then fell.
Turnout 1788 - 1992
Trust in Government (old Series)
Trust in Government 1952 - 1992
Trust in Government (new Series from ICPSR) - Different Methodology - went
up under President Clinton.
Trust in Government 1958 - 2000
Table 5.3 (Stewart) - Attitudes and Turnout.
The Relationship Between Attitudes Toward
the U.S. and Voter Turnout in the 1994 Congressional Elections
Figure 5.2 (Stewart) - Variation in Turnout Among House
Districts - 1994 (Low) vs. 1996 (High)
Variation in Turnout Among House Districts,
1994 and 1996
Figure 5.3 (Stewart) - Turnout and Winning Percentage of the
Vote - House Elections 1994 and 1996
Turnout and Winning Percentage of the Vote, House
Elections, 1994 and 1996
- Congressional Elections -- Progressive Ambition
State and Federal Hierarchy of Offices
State and Federal Hierarchy of Offices
Table 4.1 (Stewart) - MA Example of Progressive Ambition
Prior Careers of the MA Delegation to the
House, 91st Congress (1969-71)
Table 4.4 (Stewart) - Low and High Quality challengers
Success of High and Low Quality Challengers
in 1994
- Congressional Elections -- Campaign Spending
Figure 4.2 (Stewart) - Campaign Spending in House Races, 1980 - 1998
(in 1999 dollars)
Campaign Spending in
House Races, 1980 - 1998 (1999 Dollars)
Cost of Winning Election to the House (2000 dollars) - Note
that it is higher during Presidential Election years - trend is upward
The Cost of Winning a House
Election, 1986 - 2000 (2000 Dollars)
Cost of Winning a Senate Election -- 1986 - 2000 (With and Without
Corzine and Clinton, 2000)
The Cost of Winning a Senate
Election, 1986 - 2000 (2000 Dollars)
Mean Expenditures of House Challengers Who Beat Incumbents
The Cost to Defeat a House
Incumbent, 1984 - 2000
Percentage of Incumbents' Campaign Funds that Came From PACs. Note that it
changes after 1994 in the House. Also note that the lines are basically flat.
Percentage of Incumbents' Campaign Monies
From PACS, 1984 - 2000
Percentage of PAC Support for Non-Incumbents - Note that it drops sharply
in the early period then levels off - PACS like incumbents!
Percentage of Non-Incumbents' Campaign Monies
From PACS, 1984 - 2000
Political Party Contributions and Coordinated Expenditures for Congress - Money
has not really gone down, it just was diverted elsewhere
Party Contributions and Coordinated
Expenditures, 1976 - 2000
Independent Expenditures in Senate and House Elections - Note the upward
trend in the House
Independent Expenditures in Congressional
Elections, 1978 - 2000
Soft Money Spending by the Parties - SATURNALIA!!!!
Soft Money Spending by the National Political
Parties
All Soft Money Spending
Table 6.3 (Stewart) - Buckley v. Valeo (1976) - Where this mess came from! Many
of the provisions struck down by the Court are back in the McCain-Feingold bill
The Effect of Buckley v. Valeo (1976) (Table 6.3 Stewart)
Table 6.4 (Stewart) - The Growth of PACS, 1974 - 1998
The Growth of PACs by Type
Table 6.5 (Stewart) - Contribution of PACs to Candidates, 1980 - 1998, by Type
Contributions of PACs by Type
Table 6.6 (Stewart) - Sources of Campaign Receipts for Congressional Races, 1998
Sources of 1998 House Campaign Monies
Figure 6.9 (Stewart) - Campaign Spending and the Vote in House Races in 1996 -
Why Incumbents Love the System!! McCain-Feingold will only help incumbents
Campaign Spending and
the Vote in House Races in 1996
- Congressional Elections -- Voters, Candidates, and Issues
Figure 4-2 (Erikson and Wright) - Partisanship and Seat Shares - Note
that they roughly track but we need to factor in turnout.
Democratic Seats and Vote Share, 1952 - 1998
Figure 4-3 (Erikson and Wright) - Spending Preferences from NPAT surveys
Spending Preferences for Democratic
and Republican COngressional Candidates, 1998
Figure 4-4 (Erikson and Wright) - Issue differences by party.
Note how all these spending and issue positions are correlated.
Party Differences Among House
Candidates on Selected Issues, 1998
With Respect to Figure 4-4 (Erikson and Wright), recall the discussion of
The Basic Space and The Mapping of Issues
The Basic Space and Issue Mappings
Figure 4-6 (Erikson and Wright) - Incumbency advantage - horizontal axis
1996 Clinton Vote, vertical axis 1998 House Vote
The Incumbency Advantage in the
House, 1998
Table 4-1 (Erikson and Wright) - Quality of Challengers
Incumbents Facing Quality Challengers
in the 1998 House Elections
Figure 4-7 (Erikson and Wright) - Ideology by Presidential Vote - Note that
this has both candidates from NPAT
Republican and Democratic 1998
Candidate Ideology by District Presidential Vote in 1996
Figure 4-8 (Erikson and Wright) - Ideology and the House Vote - Note that
the "M"s should be clustered around 50% Clinton Vote
Ideology and the House Vote, 1998
Figure 4-9 (Erikson and Wright) - Note "S" Shape. These are winners regardless
of party
Winner's Ideology by District
Presidential Vote
Table 4-3 (Erikson and Wright) - How Voters Perceive the Candidates
Voter's Perceptions of the
Ideology of their House Representative
- How a Bill Becomes a Law
Overview of the Process
Inside the Sausage Factory -- How a Bill Becomes a Law
Figure 9.1 (Stewart) - Number of Bills Introduced
Bills Introduced in and Passed by Congress,
1947 - 1988
Table 9.1 (Stewart) -- Hurdles in the Process
Legislative Hurdles
Table 9.2 (Stewart) -- Rules Committee: Open, Closed, and Special Rules
Special Rules in the House
Table 9.3 (Stewart) -- Daily Order of Business
Daily Order of Business in the House and
Senate, 106th House
Figure 9.5 (Stewart) -- The Full House Floor Voting Tree
Two Views of the House Amendment Tree
- The Committee System
House and Senate Committees in the 107th Congress.
Note the sizes of the House Committees and
how Subcommittees "chop up" the jurisdictions. The Party Ratios on the
Committees are very close to the overall party ratio of the House. The
Senate Committee system roughly parallels the House albeit with much
closer party ratios.
The Committee System in the 107th
Congress
Table 8.1 (Stewart) -- The Types of Congressional Committees
A Morphology of Congressional Committees
Table 8.2 (Stewart) - Jurisdictions of the Ways & Means and Senate Finance
Committees (Remember the Constitution!)
Jurisdiction of the House Ways and Means
Committee and Senate Finance Committee in the 106th Congress
Figure 8.1 (Stewart) -- History of Committees - The Number of Committees Over
Time - Note the slow rise of Standing Committees into the 20th Century. This
corresponds to the growth of Industrial Capitalism
The Number of Committees in the House and
Senate, 1789 - 1998
Figure 8.2 (Stewart) - Party Ratios over time on the Taxing Committees - Unless
the majority party has a super-large majority, it has a bigger majority on
the taxing committees - that is a measure of How Important they are.
Percentage of Seats Held by the Majority Party
on House and Senate Taxing Committees
Table 8.7 (Stewart) - Committee Rankings based upon transfer patterns.
The Pecking Order - The Prestige Hierarchy!
Relative Attractiveness Ranking of House and
Senate Committees, 81st to 102nd Congresses
Figure 8.4 (Stewart) - Structure Induced Equilibrium Example - How the
policy space gets carved up into jurisdictions so that bills emerging
from committees may not match the median voter of the chamber.
Structure Induced Equilibrium Example with
Committees